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Soon, euro area membership could more than double, with the vast majority of accession 
countries being quite different in economic terms compared with current members. Under the 
current decision-making system, this can lead to high decisionmaking costs and there is a risk 
that monetary policy could deviate from the targets specified in the Maastricht treaty. While 
centralization might be a “first-best” solution to these problems in many ways, there are 
possible disadvantages from a political economy perspective, including a potential conflict 
with the established voting rights of current euro area member countries. An alternative 
solution to ensure the European perspective of decision-making in the ECB Council is to 
match economic size and voting power. One way to implement this principle is a rotation 
scheme for national central bank governors that takes economic differences between the 
member countries into account. The paper discusses various rotation schemes, also with a 
view to the decision-making cost argument. 
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On 1 January 1999 Europe entered a new era with the adoption of a single currency – 
the euro – by 11 of the European Union’s 15 member states. Greece joined the euro 
area in 2001. With the start of the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU), the 
European Central Bank (ECB) is responsible for monetary policy in the euro area. 
The ECB’s primary objective as laid down in the Maastricht Treaty is price stability, 
quantified by the ECB as inflation in the euro area below 2 per cent in the medium 
run. The ECB’s Governing Council, which decides about interest rates, consists of the 
Executive Board of the ECB - made up of the president, the vice-president and four 
other members - and the central-bank governors of the 12 euro countries (see Figure 
1). When taking monetary policy decisions, the members of the Governing Council of 
the ECB should not act as national representatives, but in a fully independent personal 
capacity. This is reflected in the principle of  “one person, one vote”. 
Even though the ECB is a very young institution, there is already a debate 
going on about its reform in view of the upcoming enlargement of the European 
Union (EU). The European Council of Nice of December 2000 has asked the ECB 
Governing Council to prepare suggestions for a reform of its statute by the end of 
2002.  
There are basically two reasons why the issue of reform of the ECB is on the 
political agenda. First, ten Eastern European countries
1 and two Southern European 
countries (Malta and Cyprus) are expected to apply for euro area membership after 
accession to the EU.
2 Furthermore, three EU members, that are currently not members 
of the euro area, could adopt the euro in the near future (the United Kingdom, 
Sweden, and Denmark). So membership in the Eurosystem might increase from the 
current 12 to 27. In the absence of modification of the current ECB statute, this 
enlargement could have severe consequences for the efficiency of monetary policy-
making in the euro area. A larger ECB Council would experience greater difficulties 
in decision-making than the smaller body governing monetary policy in the euro area 
                                                 
1 The countries are Slovenia, Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Estonia, Slovak Republic, Latvia, 
Lithuania, Bulgaria, and Romania. 
2 Since EMU membership is part of the acquis communautaire of the EU, accession countries will join 
EMU and the European System of Central Banks (ESCB) as they join the EU. However, EMU and 
ESCB membership do not necessarily imply euro area membership, as countries wanting to adopt the 
euro must fulfil the Maastricht criteria.   3
today. Without reform of the current ECB statute, the size of the ECB Council could 
increase from 18 to 33, making it by far the largest monetary policy-making 
institution among OECD countries. Due to this increase in membership, discussion 
and voting procedures would likely become more time-consuming and complicated. 
The central bank’s tradition of consensus-based policy-making – said to play an 
important role in today’s ECB decision-making process, too – could further amplify 
the ECB’s “number problem” and increase decision-making costs. 
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Executive Board of the ECB    Vice-President      Vice-President  and 
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countries participating in the Euro area           national central 
banks of all EU 
countries 
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Source: Eijffinger and De Haan (2000) 
  
 
Second, an increase in euro area member states without reform would affect the 
wedge between the economic and political weights of EMU member countries within 
the ECB. Since almost all accession countries are small in economic terms relative to 
current euro area members, enlargement within the given institutional set-up would 
significantly increase the degree of over-representation of the area’s smaller member 
countries in the Council in terms of relative economic size. For instance, in a 
monetary union with 27 members the current ECB statute implies that the 
representatives of its smallest 17 member states, representing only about 10 per cent   4
of the area’s aggregated GDP, could determine monetary policy decisions in the euro 
area. Over-representation, while not necessarily a problem per se, has the potential to 
introduce an unwelcome bias into the ECB’s decision-making, if country 
representatives put at least some weight on national economic developments and these 
developments deviated notably from the behavior of euro-area aggregates. Since the 
bulk of the accession countries are transition economies, they may be subject to 
idiosyncratic shocks and somewhat higher structural inflation than the core of the euro 
area. There is reason to believe that such asymmetries could have an impact on ECB 
policy-making.
3  
In this paper we discuss various ECB reform options. We argue that, while 
centralization might be a “first-best” solution to the problems potentially associated 
with enlargement in many ways, it might have disadvantages from a political 
economy perspective, including a potential conflict with the established voting rights 
of current euro area member countries. An alternative solution to ensure the European 
perspective of decision making in the ECB Council is to match economic size and 
voting power. When countries have voting power in proportion to their GDP share, it 
matters less if they behave according to national instead of euro-area-wide interests. 
One way to implement this principle – even if imperfect in practice – is to introduce a 
rotation scheme for national central bank governors that takes economic differences 
between the member countries into account.  
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 discusses the 
two basic problems of an enlarged EMU in somewhat more detail. Section 3 reviews 
reform options, while section 4 focuses on one specific option: rotation. Various 
rotation schemes are discussed. Section 5 examines the reform proposal recently put 
forward by the ECB. The final section offers some concluding comments. 
 
 
2. The main problems 
 
The upcoming enlargement of the euro area is likely to influence the effectiveness of 
the ECB’s current policy-making framework through at least two channels: the 
                                                 
3 Indeed, some critics of the ECB argued that its decentralized nature was a design flaw right from the 
beginning. For instance, The Economist (1998, pp. 85-6) stated that: “The Governing Council is 
supposed to set interest rates according to conditions in the euro area as a whole, but there is a risk that 
national governors will be unduly influenced by conditions in their home country. Small countries may   5
increase in the number of decision-makers and the growing heterogeneity of member 
countries in economic terms.
4 Turning, first, to the implied increase in the number of 
decision-makers involved, Table 1 reveals that the number of Council members could 
increase from currently 18 members to up to 33 in the scenario that includes 
membership of the potential new EU countries as well as the U.K., Sweden, and 
Denmark.  An increase in the number of Council members of this magnitude could 
complicate decision-making. Table 1 (fourth column) shows that the ECB Council, 
with its 6 Board members and 12 national central bank governors, is already relatively 
large compared to the decision making bodies of other federal central bank systems, 
like the Bundesbank’s Zentralbankrat and the Fed’s Federal Open Market Committee 
(FOMC). After enlargement, the number of voting members in the ECB Council 
could be almost three times higher than the number of FOMC members and twice as 
high as the number of Zentralbankrat members. 
 
 








(1) + (2) 
%
) 2 ( ) 1 (
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+
  Federal central bank models 
Bundesbank pre-1957  1  9  10  90.0 
Bundesbank pre-1992  7  11  18  61.1 
Bundesbank
a) 8  9  17  52.9 
Fed
b) 7  5  12  41.7 
ECB 1999  6  11  17  64.7 
ECB 2001  6  12  18  66.7 
ECB with 27 EMU 
members 6  27  33  81.8 
 
a) Since the 1992 Bundesbank reform, 9 regional central banks cover all 17 
Länder. A further reform of the Bundesbank status is under discussion.  
b) At any given time, only 5 out of the 12 regional central banks hold 
FOMC voting rights. The NY Fed is allocated a permanent seat in the 
FOMC, while the remaining 4 seats rotate among the remaining 11 
regional central banks. 
 
Source: Central banks, own calculations. 
 
  
                                                                                                                                            
also carry undue weight in the system…. A weak centre, combined with strong national interests, could 
create conflicts that undermine the whole system’s credibility.”
  
4 See Berger (2002) for a somewhat more extensive treatment of the issues covered in Section 2.    6
 
Both the Bundesbank and the Fed have constrained the size of their decision-
making bodies with a view to decision-making costs. For instance, Eichengreen 
(1992) argues that today’s organizational framework of the Fed – which restricts the 
number of regional central banks voting in the FOMC to 5 out of 12 – was installed, 
among other reasons, to reduce inefficiencies stemming from the involvement of too 
many decision-makers. As far as the Bundesbank is concerned, it is interesting to note 
that the reform of 1992 prevented an increase in the number of Länder representatives 
in the Bundesbank Council after unification. Without a reform, the Council could 
have increased to 23 or more members, which, according to the Bundesbank, “would 
have greatly complicated that body’s decision-making processes” (Deutsche 
Bundesbank 1992, p. 50). This echoes concerns raised by Friedman and Schwartz 
(1963). In their seminal study of American monetary policy, they attribute the severity 
of the depression of the 1930s to serious policy mistakes by the Federal Reserve, 
caused by its excessively decentralized decision-making structure: 
 
“There is more than a little element of truth in the jocular description of a 
committee as a group of people, no one of whom knows what should be done, 
who jointly decide that nothing can be done. And this is especially likely to be 
true of a group like the Open Market Policy Conference, consisting of 
independent persons from widely separated cities, who share none of that 
common outlook on detailed problems or responsibilities which evolves in the 




According to Friedman and Schwartz, the consequence of a weak center is that the 
decision-making process becomes too cumbersome and slow, possibly resulting in 
sub-optimal decisions. An ECB Council with more than 30 members is likely to need 
significantly more time than today’s Council of 18 to discuss and evaluate the state of 
the economy and to prepare monetary policy decisions. Even though a more extensive 
use of explicit voting procedures might help to limit decision-making costs, the 
prevalent culture of consensus-based decision-making in the ECB Council might limit 
the use of voting practices. Baldwin and others (2001) argue that, in addition, the 
Board’s leadership ability will be seriously reduced as the number of  countries in the 
euro area  increases and its relative voting power decreases.   7
A second insight provided by Table 1 (fifth column) is that the political weight 
attached to national or regional central bank representatives within the ECB 
framework is comparatively large. In many industrial countries, monetary policy 
decisions are delegated to central banks with smaller decision-making bodies in which 
all members are centrally appointed. Both the German Bundesbank and the U.S. Fed 
have systematically reduced the political weight of regional representatives in the 
Council (Eichengreen 1992, Berger and de Haan 1997). While, at an earlier stage, 
both institutions resembled unions of national central banks, over time, the central 
element in both central banks was strengthened. Today, the vote share of regional 
representatives is about 53 per cent of all votes in the case of the Bundesbank and 
about 42 per cent in case of the Fed’s FOMC. The political weight of national central 
bank governors in the ECB Council at about 67 per cent of all votes is significantly 
higher; and this percentage could increase to as much as 82  per cent after 
enlargement.   8
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Under the current decision-making set-up of the ECB, small member countries carry a 
larger political than economic weight (Berger and de Haan 2002). The upper panel of 
Figure 2 shows the economic weight (defined as the share of a country in the euro 
area’s GDP) and political weight (the vote share of the country’s central bank 
governor in the ECB Council) of individual member countries in today’s ECB.
5 On 
the one hand, countries like France or Germany produce about 1/5 and 1/3, 
respectively, of the euro area’s GDP or more but hold only 1/18 of the overall votes. 
On the other hand, the political weight allocated by the present ECB framework to 
smaller countries such as Ireland clearly exceeds their economic weight. In fact, 
according to Figure 2, this is the case for more than half of all current euro area 
members. 
The lower panel of Figure 2 shows that in a euro area of 27 members without a 
reform of the ECB nearly 80 per cent of the countries will have a larger political than 
economic weight. If the “one person, one vote” principle were strictly applied, all 
newcomers but the U.K. would be allocated a political weight surpassing their 
economic weight, in most cases by a significant margin.
6 As already mentioned, a 
coalition of the smallest euro area members with enough votes to command the 
majority of overall Council ECB seats would represent merely about 10 per cent of 
the euro area’s total GDP. The equivalent figure in today’s euro area is close to 50 
percent. 
The over-representation of smaller member states could introduce an 
unwelcome bias into the ECB’s decision-making if: 1. national central bank governors 
put at least some weight on national economic developments, and 2. these 
developments deviate significantly from the behavior of euro area aggregates.
7 For 
instance, a decrease in euro area economic activity is probably more strongly felt in a 
country with relatively low per-capita income than in better-off regions. Likewise, 
countries with already a high level of inflation might be more sensitive to a euro-area-
wide increase in inflation than low-inflation regions.  
                                                 
5 We assume that the nationality of members of the Executive Board does not influence the political 
weight of a country. 
6 See Berger (2002) for a more extensive analysis of the impact that enlargement has on the mismatch 
between economic and political weights. 
7 Gros and Hefeker (2002) analyze differences in monetary transmission in the context of monetary 
policy-making within the euro area.   10
Even though “members of the [Council] do not act as national representatives, 
but in a fully independent personal capacity” (ECB 1999, p.  55), it is certainly 
possible that national economic welfare plays at least some role in the (voting) 
behavior of regional representatives in the ECB Council. Indeed, if national 
background should not play any role in the ECB decision-making process, why then 
have the European governments not delegated monetary policy fully to the Executive 
Board in the first place? In fact, the hypothesis of regional influences in a federal 
central bank system is supported by recent studies on U.S. and German monetary 
policy. Berger and de Haan (2002) present evidence that regional differences in 
growth and inflation had a significant influence on the voting behavior of 
Zentralbankrat members. Similarly, Meade and Sheets (2002) find that Fed policy-
makers do take developments in regional unemployment into account when deciding 
on monetary policy in the FOMC. They show that an increase in a region’s 
unemployment rate (for a given national rate and evaluated at sample means) by one 
percentage point reduced the probability that a FOMC member dissented from the 
majority vote by about 2  percentage points over the 1978-2000 period. While no 
direct evidence of such behavior exists for today’s ECB, Meade and Sheets (2002) 
argue that recent interest rate decisions by the ECB Council at least do not allow 
rejecting the hypothesis that national central bank governors vote with a regional bias 
in the euro area as well.
8 
As argued above, a too strong representation of new national central bank 
representatives in the ECB Council could introduce a bias into euro area policy- 
making after enlargement, if the behavior of their respective national economies 
deviates significantly from today’s euro area. But just how different are economic 
developments and what consequences might follow for monetary policy?  
Probably the most important distinguishing feature of the majority of 
candidate countries is their status as transition economies. Real per capita income in 
most accession countries is very low compared to current euro area levels and the 
process of convergence is commonly thought to be slow. Fischer and others (1998a/b) 
estimate that it might take many Eastern European countries until the 2020s at the 
                                                 
8 Recently, Heinemann and Huefner (2002) have estimated reaction functions for the ECB. As there are 
no voting records for the ECB Governing Council, these authors had to rely on indirect ways to 
examine whether diverging economic developments in the euro area have affected ECB policy-making. 
In their ordered probit model, these authors find that the difference between euro area average and   11
minimum to catch up even with the less well-off countries in the current euro area. 
Slowly diminishing income differences could make real growth an attractive policy 
target for some of the governors representing accession countries in the ECB Council.  
The data show that – as to be expected during real conversion – the average 
growth rate of accession countries during 1996-2001, while falling short of the rates 
achieved in some faster growing member countries such as Ireland and Finland, 
exceeded average growth in the euro area by about 1 percentage point (Berger 2002, 
Figure  3). Recent empirical work suggests that this trend is likely to continue, 
contributing to a considerable increase in the dispersion of growth rates within the 
euro area compared to the status quo.
9 One likely consequence of higher-than-average 
growth in the accession countries in the years ahead is higher inflation than in the 
current euro area. Indeed, the average inflation differential between the euro area and 
accession countries was around 8  percentage points during 1996-2001, even with 
Bulgaria and Romania – two high-inflation countries – excluded (ibid.).  
It is often argued that due to the Balassa-Samuelson effect, transition countries 
have experienced a real appreciation of their real exchange rates. When productivity 
growth in the traded goods sector exceeds that in the non-traded goods sector, non-
traded goods prices increase due to the wage equalization process between both 
sectors. When productivity growth in the transition countries exceeds productivity 
growth in the countries in the euro area, the transition countries will have a higher 
inflation rate. According to Eurostat (2001), the average labor productivity level in 
manufacturing in transition countries was only about 40 per cent of the EU average in 
1998. A process of catch-up would imply high productivity growth in the future, and 
consequently, higher inflation rates relative to current euro area members.  
 
                                                                                                                                            
median of the inflation and output gap is significantly different from zero, albeit only at the 10 per cent 
level. 
9 Eichengreen and Ghironi (2001) use an empirical growth model based on data from the 1980s and 
1990s to predict future growth for a set of accession countries that includes Turkey, but excludes 
Bulgaria, Cyprus, and Malta. In a panel study, Crespo-Cuaresma and others (2002) find the length of 
EU membership to have a significant positive effect on economic growth, which is relatively higher for 
poorer countries. Havrylyshyn (2001) provides a recent survey on the available empirical evidence on 
growth during transition.   12
 
Table 2. Estimates of the inflation differentials (%) in the transition countries 
Study: Countries:  Vis-à-vis 
(if relevant): 
Size: 
Jakab and Kovacs (1999)  Hungary    1.9 
Pelkmans et al. (2000)  CEE 10  29 OECD countries  3.8 
Rother (2000)  Slovenia    2.6  during 1993-98 


















2.9-3.1 for the period 1991-99 
Corizelli and Jazbec (2001)  Panel of 19 
transition 
countries 
Based on model for 
relative price of 
tradable goods  
1 in the medium term (1990-98) 
De Broeck and Sløk (2001)  Panel of transition 
countries 
  On average 1.5  






a)    0.303 for 1991-2000 
2.589      1.295 for 1991-2000 
3.245      1.901 for 1991-2000 
-0.154    -0.075 for 1993-2000 
1.321       0.661 for 1993-2000 




Germany  With share of non-tradables as in 
GDP it ranges from 0.094 to 1.903 
depending on time period and data. 
Estimates for 1996-2001 period 
range from 1.707 to 1.903. With 
share of non-tradables as in CPI the 
latter range from 0.810 to 1.059. 







0.35  1995-2000 
3.84  1995-2000 
9.76  1995-2000 
3.88  1995-2000 
a) First column shows results using GDP deflator, second column shows results with CPI. 
b) Under the assumption that there are no productivity-inflation differentials between tradable and non-
tradable goods in the main trading partners, which seems unrealistic. 
   13
  
 
There is, however, no clear consensus in the literature on the magnitude of the 
Balassa-Samuelson effect in the transition countries. Table 2 provides a summary of 
various recent studies. Various estimates conclude that it contributes about 
2-4 percentage points to headline inflation.
10 Still, the estimates vary widely. Whereas 
Pelkmans et al.  (2000), for instance, estimate that the Balassa-Samuelson effect is 
likely to imply almost four additional percentage points of annual inflation in the 
accession economies, Ėgert (2002a) finds little evidence of a higher inflation rate due 
to the Balassa-Samuelson effect in the Czech Republic and Slovakia.
11  
Part of these diverging outcomes is the result of differences in method. For 
instance, not all studies summarized in Table 2 restrict themselves to estimates of the 
Balassa-Samuelson effect. The literature has pointed out various other channels that 
can give rise to inflation differentials and some of the studies take these into account. 
For instance, Halpern and Wyplosz (2001), who estimate the Balassa-Samuelson 
effect for a panel of nine transition countries (including Russia) also include demand 
factors. The same is true for Corizelli and Jazbec (2001), who, in addition, add a 
variable that captures structural misalignments.
12  
Yet another distinguishing feature of the candidate countries might be the 
business cycle. Table 3 shows the correlation between the cyclical components of 
industrial production in the various (potential) member states with the cyclical part of 
industrial production in the euro area. Industrial production is decomposed into a 
trend and a cyclical component, using a Hodrick-Prescott filter (see also Artis and 
Zhang 1999 and Inklaar and De Haan 2001).
13  It follows that except for Slovenia and, 
to a lesser extent, Cyprus, the accession countries have business cycles, which are 
hardly synchronized with the business cycle in the euro area. Note, however, that this 
also holds true for some euro area countries, notably Greece and Portugal. 
                                                 
10 Most studies concede that Balassa-Samuelson effects, while being quantitatively important, cannot 
explain the entire difference in structural inflation between accession and euro area countries. 
11 The Balassa-Samuelson effect is often seen as argument why accession countries may find it difficult 
to meet simultaneously the Maastricht criteria on inflation and exchange rate stability. See, for 
instance, Szapary (2000). 
12 A very different estimation procedure has been followed by Pelkmans et al. (2000). These authors 
have based their estimation on relative price levels in accession countries compared to current EMU 
member countries rather than on productivity growth differentials. Their results show on average an 
inflation differential of 3.8 percentage points between the accession countries and the euro area average 
due to estimated differences in the price levels. 
13 See the Appendix 2 for further details and sources of the data used.   14
 
Table 3. Business cycle correlation (with EU12) for the period 1990-2001 
Current EU members  Future EU members 
Austria 0.49  Bulgaria  n.a. 
Belgium 0.36  Cyprus  0.32 
Finland 0.36  Czech  Rep.  0.11 
France 0.76  Estonia  0.11 
Germany 0.75  Hungary  0.20 
Greece 0.18  Latvia  0.17 
Ireland 0.26  Lithuania  -0.17 
Italy 0.62  Malta  n.a. 
Luxembourg 0.38  Poland  0.17 
Netherlands 0.33  Romania  -0.04 
Portugal 0.06  Slovakia 0.12 






Note: see Appendix 2 for sources and methods. 
 
 
Business cycles may differ across currency areas or regions within a currency area for 
various reasons. First, currency areas and regions may experience different shocks. 
Secondly, they may respond differently to common shocks. This may be caused by 
dissimilar reactions of policy-makers to a common shock, or because of differences in 
the currency area or regional composition of output. In addition, heterogeneity in 
financial and economic structure may lead to differences in the monetary policy 
transmission mechanism. 
Figure 3 sheds further light on the correlation of shocks. It displays the 
correlation of demand shocks and supply shocks in quarterly real GDP between 
individual euro area and accession countries with demand and supply shocks in the 
euro area aggregate computed by Fidrmuc and Korhonen (2001). The sample period is 
1991/92-2000 for most countries. Shocks are identified using two-variable VARs for 
output and prices and the Blanchard and Quah (1989) assumptions. The results 
suggest that, on average, demand and supply shocks are more closely correlated 
within the euro area. Most present euro area countries are located in the upper-right 
part of the figure, while the majority of accession countries can be found in the lower-  15
left, indicating non-significant or negative correlation.
14 Exceptions are two of the 
more advanced countries among the candidate countries, Estonia and Hungary. 
Greece, a late-comer to the euro area and still early in its real convergence process, 





Figure 3. Demand and Supply Shocks in the Euro Area and 




























































Source: Fidrmuc and Korhonen (2001), Table 2. 
 
                                                 
14 The weighted average of the demand and supply shocks coefficients of correlation are 0.24 and 0.52 
for the euro area countries and 0.13 and 0.11 for the accession countries (Malta and Cyprus excluded).   16
 
The main message stemming from the analysis thus far is that most accession 
countries are subject to different macroeconomic shocks – and thus a different 
business cycle – than the current euro area. While real convergence will probably 
work to reduce these idiosyncrasies in the long run, they will certainly remain in the 
short- and medium-term. In the absence of reform of the present ECB framework, this 
could have an impact on monetary policy-making in the euro area. 
 
 
3. Reform Options 
 
The discussion above suggests that, possible reforms of the ECB should aim at: 
keeping the number of decision makers on the ECB Council within reasonable limits; 
strengthening the voting power of the Board; and aligning the economic and political 
weights of countries in the Council with one another.
15 A number of possible reform 
scenarios along these lines can be distinguished. 
 
3.1 Centralization 
A larger role for the Executive Board in ECB decision-making would go a long way 
limiting  decision-making costs and preventing possibly diverging economic 
developments within a larger euro area to have an undue impact on monetary policy 
in the euro area.
16 
A pragmatic application of the centralization scenario would be to put actual 
policy-decisions into the hands of the existing ECB Board. This would limit the role 
of the Council to that of an informational forum in which the area’s regional central 
banks would be informed of policy decisions and implementation issues would be 
discussed.
17 The EU Treaty states that the Board (including the President of the ECB, 
the Vice-President, and four additional members) is appointed by “the governments of 
                                                 
15 Berger (2002) provides a more formal discussion of these reform considerations. See Appendix 1 for 
a summary. See also Baldwin et al. (2000, 2001) and Eichengreen and Ghironi (2001) for papers 
dealing with ECB reform. 
16 The advantages of a stronger role for the centrally nominated ECB Board were also discussed in the 
literature on the optimal institutional design of the ECB before the (virtual) euro was introduced in 
1999. See, among others, von Hagen and Süppel (1994) and Lohmann (1997, 1998). Also compare 
Bindseil (2001). In light of the enlargement discussion, Baldwin and others (2001) argue for full 
centralization, pointing to the increase in decision-making costs implied by euro area enlargement. 
17 This is akin to some of the functions the General Council of the European System of Central Banks 
performs today. The General Council will exist as long as some EU countries remain outside the euro 
area. See Figure 1.   17
the member states at the level of Heads of State or Government, on a recommendation 
from the Council, after it has consulted the European Parliament and the Governing 
Council of the ECB” (EU 1997, Article 112  2. (b)). A highly centralized political 
process on the European level like this should help support a euro-area-wide 
perspective  of those selected for the Board. There are, however a number of 
arguments that suggest that national central banks should continue to play an 
important role in ECB decision-making (Berger 2002). 
•  A first argument concerns information. Efficient monetary policy requires the 
timely provision, aggregation, and processing of information originating on the 
regional level, especially in the case of a currency union that encompasses a large 
number of heterogeneous countries and regions. It might therefore be helpful to 
ensure that ECB Council members with a strong regional anchor such as national 
central bank governors are directly involved in actual monetary policy decision. 
•  A second argument is that the absence of national central bank governors from the 
ECB Council could have a negative effect on the ECB’s political independence. 
The participation of all euro area member states in the selection of ECB Council 
members (through the nomination of their respective national central bank 
governors) in the current ECB statute might help insulating the ECB from 
preference shocks at the government level, for instance, after elections.  
•  A third argument against allocating the complete decision-making power in the 
ECB Council to the Board, alludes to the political feasibility of centralization. As 
already mentioned, the ECB Statute clearly states, “Each member of the 
Governing Council, shall have one vote” (EU 1992, Article 10.2), which includes 
the national central bank governors. Thus, a reform of the ECB that fails to 
safeguard the established voting rights of current member countries’ central banks 
might not be politically acceptable. After all, an equal right to participate in ECB 
policy decision-making was an integral part of the Maastricht treaty that 
established the currency union. Some member governments could experience 
opposition to letting go the “last” bit of influence on ECB policy making after 
having exchanged monetary sovereignty for a seat at the ECB Council in 1999. 
 
3.2 Matching economic size and political power 
If centralization is not a feasible (or desirable) reform option, a reform of the ECB 
Statute should aim at an institutional design in which economic size and political   18
voting power are in line.
18 When countries have as much voting power as GDP share, 
it is less problematic if they behave according to national instead of euro-area-wide 
interests. Decreasing the mismatch between economic and political weights would 
bring actual stabilization policy closer to the outcome under the first-best solution. In 
fact, fully matching political and economic weights is likely to guarantee that actual 
monetary policy is perfectly in line with the ideal policy of stabilizing the euro area 
business cycle based on a correctly weighted average of the underlying regional 
cycles. If the accession countries were politically over-represented in the absence of a 
reform of the current ECB decision-making framework, the second-best solution is 
also likely to reduce actual inflation, although it will probably remain higher than in 
the first-best solution (Berger 2002). The principal reform options include: vote-
weighting, representation, extending regional central banks across national borders, 
and rotation. 
Under vote-weighting, the votes of non-Board member of the ECB Council 
would be weighted when cast for monetary policy decisions, for instance by using 
member countries’ share in euro area GDP. By definition, a reform along these lines 
would better align the political and economic weights of the national Council 
members. Vote-weighting has precedence in the qualified voting schemes of the EU 
Council, which the treaty of Nice has tentatively updated for the case of EU 
enlargement.
19 Another voting scheme that takes into account differences in economic 
size is the idea of a required “double majority” of votes and population. Under such a 
system, there is still an equal voting right for all Board members. Every decision 
requires a majority of the votes. In addition, however, it is also required that the votes 
in favor represent a majority of the population of the euro area. An alternative would 
be to require that these votes represent a majority of the euro area’s GDP. 
A problem with any vote-based reform scenarios is, however, that they do not 
necessarily address the problem of decision-making costs. Decision-making costs in 
the narrow sense of voting on, interest rate changes, say, need not to be particularly 
problematic. However, in all likelihood the Council’s decision-making process will 
involve more than the simple aggregation of votes, but also, for example, a more or 
less extensive discussion of the views of all members. In this case, weighting votes 
                                                 
18 Obviously, if none of the Council members showed a regional bias in its decision-making to begin 
with, bringing political and economic weights of national central bank governors in line will  not hurt 
the  euro-area-wide perspective of the Council either.   19
does not necessarily solve the ECB’s “large number problem”. Finally, similar to the 
argument made regarding the centralization solution, it should be noted that a 
weighted voting scheme might be viewed as interfering too much with the “one 
person, one vote” principle embedded in the ECB Statute, although this may apply 
somewhat less to the “double majority” system. 
An alternative reform scenario, representation, combines some of the 
characteristics of the centralization and the weighing approach. The principal idea 
would be to create groups of euro member countries with joint representation and 
joint voting rights in the ECB Council, integrating the concept of a strong regional 
anchor with the necessity of restricting the size of the ECB’s main decision-making 
body after the enlargement. The representation scenario requires a number of specific 
institutional decisions, in particular on group selection. The selection principle could 
be based on the idea of common economic regions (taking into account similarities in 
business cycles or economic structure), economic size, or both. Related issues are the 
number of groups, the overall Council size, and the delegation of voting power from 
group members to their representative in the ECB Council. The alternative 
institutional designs range from a restricted or “imperative” mandate (votes in the 
Council are pre-determined at the group level) to an unrestricted mandate (group 
members delegate their full voting rights to their representatives).
20 However, since 
the latter arrangement could, in principle, deprive individual group members of their 
right to participate in the decision-making, there is a potential conflict with the idea of 
national representation and the “one person, one vote”  principle. This makes a 
solution entailing some form of explicit involvement of national central banks at the 
group level before a Council decision, i.e. a restricted mandate for the group 
representatives in the Council, a likely part of any representation scenario. Such a 
restriction is likely to encompass contributions to Council discussions as well as 
formal voting. In this sense, it will alleviate the decision-making costs problem at the 
level of the ECB Governing Council. However, these costs will substantially increase 
at the level of the group. If the mandate of group representatives in the Council is 
restricted, in the sense that their actions require the explicit consent of group 
                                                                                                                                            
19 See Berger (2002) for further details. 
20 The organization of the IMF Board is an example of unrestricted mandates. Even though all 
Directors de facto operate in close collaboration with their constituency, the IMF’s Articles of 
Agreement do not de jure require them to consult them or seek their approval before casting a vote in 
the Board.    20
members, the overall time and effort needed for a Council decision will be of a similar 
magnitude, if not higher, as in the previously discussed scenario. 
A variant of the representation idea is the extension of central bank 
jurisdictions across national borders. For instance, the regional central banks in the 
U.S. Federal Reserve System extend the borders of the States of the Union and some 
of the (post-1992) Landeszentralbanken in the Bundesbank Zentralbankrat represent 
more than one German Land. An application of this principle to the ECB after 
enlargement could help to reduce the number of decision-makers in the Council. If the 
design of central bank areas aimed at establishing regional banks with approximately 
similar economic weight, it would also contribute significantly to avoiding 
mismatches between voting power and economic size. However, as with the previous 
scenarios, there could be issues regarding the political feasibility of a reform that 
included abolishing the existing voting rights of current euro area member states. 
Furthermore, it would imply that one of the basic principles of the current ECB set-
up, i.e. “representation” of countries would be given up. 
An alternative reform scenario that, in principle, might also be able to address 
both the mismatch between political and economic weights and the decision-making 
problem associated with the enlargement of euro area membership (while avoiding 
some of the political constraints discussed above) could be (asymmetric) rotation. 
The basic idea is that national central bank governors would take turns sitting at the 
Council, with the frequency of their participation scaled to match the relative 
economic weight of their respective country. Rotation would thus work to weight the 
votes of national central bank governors in an implicit fashion. Arguably, therefore, 
rotation will pose less of a conflict with the “one person, one vote” principle than 
centralization, weighted voting, or the representation scenario. While not all 
governors would be participating in every Council meeting, those who participate 
would be casting a full vote. Rotation could also serve to limit the overall size of the 
ECB Council by allowing only a fraction of central bank governors to participate in 
meetings. The ability to address the potential problems posed by enlargement while 
avoiding part of the political feasibility problems associated with some of the other 
reform ideas make rotation schemes a likely candidate for ECB reform. In the 
following section we will discuss a number of more specific options for such an ECB 
reform scenario. 
   21
 
4. Rotation schemes 
Reflecting the decision-making costs argument, we will discuss a number of rotation 
schemes under the assumption of an ECB Council of 15, with 6 Board members 
joining 9 central bank governors drawn from the population of all euro area member 
countries. A characteristic, which the rotation scenario shares with the representation 
scheme, is the necessity to pool countries.  We assume a situation in which all current 
27 potential EU-countries have joined the euro area. Based on the discussion in 
section 2, we have constructed groups on the basis of three criteria: 
•  Size, i.e. constructing groups that are homogenous regarding the share of euro area 
GDP represented by each member to ensure that the ECB Council reflects the euro 
area to the greatest extent possible 
•  Inflation, i.e. minimize the average within-group standard deviation of inflation 
•  Correlation of business cycles with other members in the group, i.e. maximize the 
within-group business cycle correlation. 
Table 4 shows the outcomes of the groupings and the probability that any country will 
occupy a seat in the ECB’s Governing Council, while Table 5 reports the 
characteristics of the various rotation schemes. All calculations for correlation with 
EU-12 averages do not include the country itself.   22
 
Table 4. Various rotation groups according to economic criteria 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 











Group1  GER  GER, FRA, ITA  FRA, GER, SWE  FRA, SPA, GER 
Group2  FRA  UK, SPA, NET  AUT, FIN, LUX  POL, CZE, HUN 
Group3  ITA  POL, BEL, SWE  BEL, DEN, UK  UK, FIN, SLN 
Group4 UK 
GER, FRA, ITA, 
UK, SPA 
AUT, POR, GRE  ITA, NET, CYP  IRE, SLK, LAT 
Group5 SPA  ROM,  CZE, 
DEN 
IRE, SPA, MAL  AUT, DEN, 
SWE 
Group6 NET,  POL 
NET, POL, BEL, 
SWE 
FIN, HUN, IRE  GRE, POR, CZE  ITA, LUX, EST 
Group7  BEL, SWE, AUT  AUT, POR, GRE  SLK, BUL, SLN  LAT, LIT, SLK  CYP, BEL, GRE 




LIT, LAT, LUX  EST, POL, SLN  NET, LIT, ROM 
Group9 DEN,  FIN,  HUN, 
IRE, SLK, BUL, 
SLN, LIT, LAT, 
LUX, CYP, EST, 
MAL 
HUN, IRE, SLK, 
BUL, SLN, LIT, 
LAT, LUX, 
CYP, EST, MAL 




Probability of occupying a Council seat in any period: (%): 
Austria (AUT)  30.36  38.70  33.3  33.3  33.3 
Belgium (BEL)  38.61  44.50  33.3  33.3  33.3 
Denmark (DEN)  21.27  25.40  33.3  33.3  33.3 
Finland (FIN)  17.21  20.50  33.3  33.3  33.3 
France (FRA)  100.00  80.00  33.3  33.3  33.3 
Germany (GER)  100.00  80.00  33.3  33.3  33.3 
Greece (GRE)  25.62  30.50 33.3  33.3  33.3 
Ireland (IRE)  11.37  18.50  33.3  33.3  33.3 
Italy (ITA)  100.00  80.00  33.3  33.3  33.3 
Luxembourg  (LUX)  2.52 4.10 33.3 33.3 33.3 
Netherlands (NET)  55.11  66.00  33.3  33.3  33.3 
Portugal (POR)  25.78  30.70  33.3  33.3  33.3 
Spain (SPA)  100.00  80.00  33.3  33.3  33.3 
Sweden (SWE)  31.03  35.80  33.3  33.3  33.3 
UK (UK)  100.00  80.00  33.3  33.3  33.3 
Bulgaria  (BUL) 7.62 12.40 33.3  33.3  33.3 
Cyprus  (CYP)  1.79 2.90 33.3 33.3 33.3 
Czech Rep. (CZE)  23.26  25.90 33.3  33.3  33.3 
Estonia  (EST)  1.71 2.80 33.3 33.3 33.3 
Hungary (HUN)  16.83  20.10  33.3  33.3  33.3 
Latvia  (LAT)  2.60 4.20 33.3 33.3 33.3 
Lithuania  (LIT)  3.85 6.30 33.3 33.3 33.3 
Malta  (MAL)  0.67 1.10 33.3 33.3 33.3 
Poland (POL)  44.89  53.70  33.3  33.3  33.3 
Romania (ROM)  25.34  28.20  33.3  33.3  33.3 
Slovakia  (SLK) 8.04 13.10 33.3  33.3  33.3 
Slovenia  (SLN)  4.53 7.40 33.3 33.3 33.3 Table 5. Characteristics the various rotation schemes 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 





1. Average GDP share 
represented 
80.65  68.48 33.33 33.33 33.33 73.21 
2. Minimum and maximum 
GDP share represented 
78.9 / 81.8  58.5 / 76.7  25.2 / 44.5  6.4 / 66.6  11.3 / 64.4  61.1/84.9 
3. Mismatch between economic 
and political weight 
a)    
7.77  10.27 17.18 17.18 17.18 17.63 
Within-group unweighted averages 
4. Average within-group 
standard deviation of inflation 
3.31 6.86 7.94 2.80  7.64 9.69 
5. Average standard deviation 
of correlation with EU12
 b)  
0.06 0.18 0.20 0.18 0.09 0.22 
6. Average within-group 
business cycle correlation
 c) 
0.62 0.29 0.19 0.23 0.41  0.26 
 
a) Measured as the sum of the squared differences between economic and political weights.
 
b) Excludes Bulgaria and Malta. 
c) Excluding the country itself. 
d) As of December 2002. 
 
Notes: see Appendix 2 for sources and methods. GDP shares are calculated as an average for the period 1990-2001. Average correlation is 
calculated over the period 1990-2001. Average inflation is for 1995-2001 to exclude the first transition years.  
A good starting point is rotation on the basis of size. The groupings under this 
heading aim at selecting countries of similar GDP share. The reason is that otherwise 
a rotation scheme could (with some positive probability) accidentally select only 
smaller countries to represent their respective groups, which would run against the 
idea to ensure that the central bank governors present in the ECB Council mirrors the 
euro area as a whole. In other words, group selection by size can help to ensure a high 
“minimum” representation of euro area GDP. A crucial issue here is whether we can 
accept that a group consists of one country only. In option Size 1 we assume that the 
‘big five’ (France, Germany, Italy, Spain and the UK) have a permanent seat in the 
Council. The size of the other groups under this option ranges from 2 (the Netherlands 
and Poland) to 13 (see column 1 in Table 4). Within each of these groups, there is 
unequal rotation, depending on the size of the countries concerned. For instance, in 
the group of Poland and the Netherlands, the latter country has a higher chance of 
occupying a Council seat in each period (55.11 per cent) than Poland (44.89 per cent). 
Obviously, the advantage of having permanent Council membership for the large 
countries is that the area represented in the decision-making of the ECB is very high. 
So, from the perspective of minimizing the risk of distorted policy-making this is 
clearly an attractive option, as – on average – almost 81 per cent of the euro area GDP 
is represented (see column 1 of Table 5). Table 5 also shows the minimum and 
maximum of the area represented (row 2). The minimum is the share of the euro area 
represented if the smallest countries in any group would be in the Council at the same 
time. Likewise, the maximum is the area represented if the biggest countries of the 
nine groups were all in the Council. For our first rotation scheme the maximum and 
minimum figures are fairly similar (78.9 and 81.8 per cent, respectively). 
How does the example fare with regard to the ratio of political and economic 
weights of central bank governors?
21 As Figure 4 reveals, except for the largest four 
countries, all 27 central bank governors still hold a political weight (i.e. vote share) 
that exceeds the economic weight of their respective country in this rotation scenario. 
However, the mismatch is substantially lower in terms of magnitude (cf. the lower 
                                                 
21 Political weights have been computed by multiplying the rotation frequencies with the overall 
number of Council seats. Based on 9 selected governors and 6 Board members, the ECB Council would 
have 15 members. The rotation frequencies are defined in equivalents of a permanent Council seat. A 
frequency of 0.5, for example, indicates that a particular governor will participate in half of all ECB 
Council meetings—e.g., occupy a Council seat every second year or participate in every second 
meeting depending on the specific implementation of the scheme.   25
part of Figure 2). Another way to show the mismatch is the sum of the squared 
differences between the economic and political weights. In calculating this measure, 
we assume that the Board casts its votes based on a GDP-weighted average of the 
euro area. This means that a country’s political weight is determined by its own vote 
share as well as the Board’s vote share to the extent of the economic weight of that 
country in the euro area. The third row of Table 5 shows the outcomes of this measure 
under the various rotation schemes that we discuss. It is clear, that our first rotation 
scheme scores best, i.e. the mismatch is lowest. 
 
 
Figure 4. Economic and political weights with size-based grouping (option size 1) 
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However, group selection by size may make groups heterogeneous along other 
dimensions. There is, for instance, reason to assume that business cycles are more 
closely correlated and structural inflation performance is more closely linked in some 
economic regions or within groups of countries of differing size. Indeed, the first 
column of Table 5 shows that the average within-group standard deviation of inflation 
is 3.31, which is relatively high in comparison to other rotation schemes despite the 
fact that 5 out of 9 groups feature a single member only.  
Furthermore, in order to maximize GDP representation, it is necessary to give 
a permanent seat to the ‘big five’. This is probably politically unacceptable for a 
majority of the current EU member states. In option size 2, we therefore try to take the 
political objections into account, while still securing sufficient representation of the 
euro area GDP in the Council. In this scenario, all countries have to rotate, including 
the ‘big five’. We assume that the latter have to share 4 seats, while the four next 
largest countries (Belgium, the Netherlands, Poland and Sweden) have to share two 
seats. The remaining three seats are occupied by groups of 3 (Austria, Greece, and 
Portugal), 4 (Czech Rep., Denmark, Finland and Romania) and 11 countries. 
Consequently, the area represented in the Council is somewhat lower (almost 69 per 
cent) than in the previous option, while the minimum and maximum share represented 
are 58.5 and 76.7 per cent, respectively (see column 2 of Table 5). The mismatch 
between economic and political weights is somewhat higher. Still, under this option 
the majority of the euro area is represented in the Council at any time. As was to be 
expected, abolishing single-member groups yields a higher average within-group 
standard deviation of inflation (5.41). Likewise, the within-group standard deviation 
of business cycle correlation with EU12 is higher (0.20), while the average within-
group business cycle correlation is lower (0.29) than in the first option. 
Although this scenario takes as its starting point that all countries have to 
rotate, the rotation is still asymmetric, which may be hard to accept by all EU 
members. After all, the current ECB set-up is based on equal treatment of all 
countries. In option size 3, we therefore assume equal rotation for all members. This 
leads to 9 groups of equal size. Germany, France and Italy are in one group, just like 
Spain, the Netherlands and the UK. As a result, in this scenario, on average every 
central bank has a probability of occupying a seat of 33.3 per cent. An obvious 
advantage of this approach is that all countries are treated in the same way. By the   27
same token, however, the average share of the euro area’s GDP covered is, on 
average, only 33.33 per cent, while the minimum and maximum shares represented 
are 25.2 and 44.5 per cent, respectively. Thus, from the perspective of minimizing the 
risk of distorted policy-making, this is clearly not an attractive option. As Figure 5 
illustrates, under all groupings with equal rotation, the match between economic and 
political weights is less than under the grouping with unequal rotation based on size 
(option size 1). The sum of squared differences between economic and political 
weights is substantially higher than under the previous rotation schemes. 
In addition, the equal rotation option based on size – while ensuring that 
groups are homogenous regarding the share of euro area GDP represented by each 
group member and, thus, securing a high minimum representation of euro area GDP – 
implies a rather high average within-group standard deviation of inflation and low 
business cycle correlation within the groups (see Table 5). Heterogeneity along these 
lines could pose a number of problems for ECB decision making if country 
representatives paid at least some attention to national economic developments. The 
higher the within-group heterogeneity, the more likely it would be that the priorities 
of group representatives would change with each rotation of the group’s voting right 
into new hands, possibly introducing unwelcome volatility in ECB decision-making. 
While this problem is present in size-based asymmetric rotation scenarios as well, it is 
amplified by the introduction of symmetric rotation. The reason is that symmetric 
rotation increases the number of rotations and, thus, the number of national central 
bank governors that is involved in ECB decision-making in any given period of time.   28
 
Figure 5. Economic and political weights in groupings with equal rotation 
 


















 The final options we discuss also take equal rotation as its starting point, but try to 
improve upon the within-group characteristics. They are based on the minimization of 
the within-group standard deviation of inflation and maximization of the within-group 
business cycle correlation. In other words, we group countries on the basis of similar 
inflation rates and business cycles. As before, due to the equal rotation principle, 
rotation is based on 9 groups of 3 countries. It is interesting to note that the inflation 
rotation scheme results in groupings that – at first sight – could seem counter-intuitive 
to some. For instance, the Netherlands ends up in one group with Italy.
22 The average 
within-group business cycle correlation is somewhat higher than under option size 3, 
but still rather low (0.23), which suggests that factors in addition to business cycle 
synchronization contribute to inflation differentials within our group of countries. On 
the other hand, organizing groups on the basis of equal rotation with a view to 
maximization of the within-group business cycle correlations, while yielding a higher 
correlation (0.41), leads to higher within-group heterogeneity with regard to inflation. 
                                                 
22 EU-commissioner Bolkenstein, who at the time of the decision of EMU membership was the leader 
of the liberal party in the Dutch parliament, argued that the Netherlands should not join EMU if Italy 
was allowed in, given the weak fundamentals in Italy.    29
As mentioned earlier, the result that the first two reform options yield relatively high 
within-group business cycle correlations is caused by the fact that these options allow 
for asymmetric group sizes. Also, note that the fifth rotation scheme yields a relatively 
low standard deviation of business cycle correlation with the EU12, which is probably 
caused by the fact that countries that have a diverging business cycle vis-à-vis the EU 
12 are grouped together in this scheme. The final rotation options have very low 
minimum shares of the euro area represented (6.4 per cent under the inflation rotation 
scheme and 11.3 per cent under the business cycle correlation scheme). 
To sum up, Table 5 suggests that the selection of countries into rotation-
groups involves a number of decisions and tradeoffs. First, it is obvious that the 
representation of the euro area GDP suffers substantially if all countries are forced to 
rotate at an equal frequency. Equal rotation implies a higher mismatch between 
economic and political weights than unequal rotation. Second, while it would seem 
that asymmetric rotation in combination with group selection by size goes a long way 
to secure within-group homogeneity with regard to inflation and business cycle 
correlation, there are some costs as well. A comparison of the result for rotation 
schemes (3) to (5) shows that, holding rotation frequencies equal across countries and 
constant, group selection by size secures a relatively high minimum representation of 
euro area GDP in the ECB Council but also leads to relatively higher within-group 
volatility for business cycle correlation and inflation. Third, there is an additional 
tradeoff between selecting group members for rotation based on either of the latter 
categories: higher within-groups business cycle coherence comes at the price of 
higher inflation dispersion and vice versa. Fourth, looking at average correlation with 
the EU12 business cycle across groups in rows (3) to (5), we find that selecting 
countries either by size or inflation performance increases the similarity with the 
average business cycle. 
The overall picture that emerges is broadly favorable for an asymmetric 
rotation scheme in the spirit of scheme (1). While not aiming at minimizing within-
group inflation volatility or maximizing within-group business cycle correlation, an 
asymmetric rotation scenario that allows single-county groups fairs almost as well 
regarding these criteria as rotation schemes (4) and (5). However, to the extent that 
political feasibility considerations would force all countries into rotation along the 
lines of scheme (2) – or even into fully symmetric rotation as in schemes (3) to (5) –, 
the reform of the ECB decision-making framework faces a three-way tradeoff   30
between securing a sufficient representation of euro area GDP in the ECB Council, 




5. The ECB Proposal  
 
In late 2002 – after the initial draft of the paper was presented – the ECB published its 
proposals for reform of the ECB after enlargement of EMU. The proposal will be 
considered by the EU Council in the spring of 2003. Like in the rotation schemes 
considered above, the ECB proposal puts a limit on the number of central bank 
governors exercising a voting right. In contrast to reform options (1) to (3), however, 
the ECB puts this maximum at 15, instead of 9. From a decision-making costs 
perspective, this may be considered as a rather high number. It also reduces the voting 
weight of the Board from 40 to less than 30 percent. 
The ECB proposes that, initially, there will be two groups with rotating voting 
rights. Once there are 22 euro area Member States, there will be three groups sharing 
Council seats by rotation. The ECB suggests basing the allocation of central banks to 
the groups on a ranking of their share in the euro area according to a so-called 
composite indicator of “representativeness”. The principal component of this 
composite indicator will be the Member State’s GDP. The second component will be 
the total assets of the aggregated balance sheet of monetary financial institutions 
(“TABS-MFI”) within the territory of the Member State concerned.
23 The relative 
weights of the two components are 5/6 for GDP and 1/6 for TABS-MFI.  
In particular, the ECB proposes that the first group will include the central 
bank governors from the five largest euro area Member States according to the 
ranking of the representativeness indicator (the ‘big five’). This group will have four 
votes. The second group, with eight voting rights, will consist of half of all national 
central bank governors selected from the subsequent positions in the ranking. The 
third group will be composed of the remaining governors. They will share three 
voting rights.  
For comparison purposes, we will focus on the outcomes of the ECB proposal 
under the situation with 27 members. Our calculations are based on a raking of GDP 
                                                 
23 The measure is likely to favor member countries with a relatively large financial sector and a small 
GDP share, like Luxembourg.   31
only, as information on the second element of the “representativeness” indicator is not 
yet available. Based on the GDP component of the measure alone, the second group 
will encompass the following countries: Austria, Belgium, Czech Rep., Denmark, 
Finland, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Romania, 
Slovakia, and Sweden.  
The final column in Table 5 compares the ECB proposal with the size-based 
reform options (1) to (3) as presented in the previous section. Interestingly, the average 
share of GDP represented is quite high under the reform as proposed by the ECB, even 
somewhat higher than under reform option (2), which fared “second best” in the 
discussion in Section 4 under the constraint that all Council members rotate (73 versus 
68 per cent). However, in terms of within-group characteristics, reform option (2) 
outperforms the ECB proposal. The reason for the higher volatility is that there is a 
smaller number of groups, so the within-group variability will be higher. Furthermore, 
the mismatch between the economic and political weight is larger under the ECB 
proposal than in option (2). In part, the mismatch measure reflects the fact that the 
Board has a smaller voting share than in our preferred option (40 versus less than 30 
percent). As a result, the mismatch between economic and political weights under the 
ECB proposal is even bigger than under the ‘equal rotation’ scenario (3). 
In conclusion, the ECB proposal shows a remarkable resemblance to reform 
option (2), our preferred option for reform. Both schemes are based on rotation and 
the principle of “one person one vote” applies to central banks with voting rights. In 
both proposals, the governors of the ‘big five’ have a considerably larger chance of 
having the right to vote than the other central bank governors. Under the ECB 
proposal for reform, the average share of GDP represented in the Governing Council 
of the ECB is slightly higher than in option (2). However, in terms of the mismatch 
between economic and political weight the preferred reform scheme performs better 
than the ECB proposal. This is largely due to the larger number of groups and the 
stronger position of the Board in the Governing Council suggested by scheme (2). 
 
 
6. Concluding comments 
 
Enlargement will change the way monetary policy is made in the euro area. Within a 
few years, membership could more than double, with the majority of accession 
countries being small in economic terms compared with current members. In the   32
absence of a reform of the ECB, such a significant but asymmetric expansion is likely 
to increase decision making-costs and to lead to a mismatch between the economic 
and political weight of national central banks in the ECB Council. In this paper we 
have discussed various options for reform, including the ECB proposal of late 2002. 
We argue that, while centralization could be a “first best” solution in more than one 
way, a number of political-economic arguments speak against it. The “second-best” 
solution is to match economic size and voting power. One way to implement this 
principle – even if imperfect in practice – is to introduce a rotation scheme for 
national central bank governors, which takes economic differences between the 
member countries into account. Alternative reform options to improve the match 
between economic and political power include forms of representation (including the 
possibility of introducing regional central banks encompassing multiple national 
central banks) and weighted voting. But, while both vote-weighting and 
representation could ensure that ECB Council members carry a political weight 
roughly in proportion to economic size, the large number of policy-makers involved 
under these reform scenarios (directly or indirectly) is a reason for concern. 
Approaches that aim at the centralization of decision-making power or its reallocation 
by means of an asymmetric rotation scheme promise to address not only the possible 
wedge between the economic and political weights of Council members but also the 
issue of decision costs. Figure 6 illustrates these arguments by comparing the relative 
merits of the above-mentioned reform options with regard to decision-making costs 
and the possible problems stemming from the mismatch between political and 
economic power of euro area member countries.   33
 
Figure 6. Costs of Status Quo and Reform Scenarios—A Stylized View 
 
 















Source: Berger (2002), Table 4. 
 
Notes: Policy costs entail deviations from the “first best” policy due to a mismatch 
between the political and economic weights of central bank governors in the ECB 
Council, and Matching weights describes the reduction of this mismatch. Decision 
making costs are as defined in Section 2; Delegation describes the process of 
delegating voting power from central bank governors to (fewer) delegates through 
various institutional means. The assumed negative (but not necessarily linear) 
relations in both graphs have been explored in the previous sections. The specific 





To be sure, alternative reform scenarios might be imagined and many of the 
more detailed institutional design questions involved can be answered in more than 
one way. For instance, a crucial question is whether to base rotation on a symmetric or 
asymmetric (size-based) framework. In an equal rotation scheme, countries present in 
the ECB Council represent, on average, just 50 per cent of the euro area GDP;  clearly 
not an attractive feature. We therefore prefer a system with unequal rotation, be it a 
system with a permanent seat for the five large countries, or a system in which all 
countries rotate, but where large countries rotate with a lower frequency than the 
small countries.  
The reform proposal presented by the ECB in late 2002 also comprises an 
asymmetric rotation scheme. While the ECB proposal performs well with regard to 















































Matching weights   34
particular, the proposal foresees an enlargement of the Council, which is not attractive 
from a decision-making costs perspective. It also implies a reduction in voting power 
of the Board. Notwithstanding these caveats, the ECB proposal goes a long way in 
addressing the fundamental problems of euro-area enlargement. 
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Appendix 1. A simple analytical framework 
Berger (2002) develops a simple Barro-Gordon type model of monetary policy 
making within an enlarged euro area that illustrates some of the potential problems 
involved. Output in the “in” and “out” regions comprising the euro area after 
enlargement develops according to a Lucas-supply function 
(1)  i
e
i i i y ε + π − π = ;  out in i , = , 
where y measures output, π (headline) inflation, 
e π  (headline) inflation expectations, 
and ε is a regional output shock with zero mean and known variance. Natural output 
has been normalized to 0. Headline inflation is the sum of inflation in the tradable-
goods sector, π ~ , assumed to be under direct and full control of the ECB, and a region-
specific structural (exogenous) component,  π ∆ : 
(2)  i i ,
~
π ∆ + π = π ;   out in i , = . 
The simplest possible representation of decision-making within the ECB Council is a 
bargaining approach that abstracts from possible strategic interaction between Council 
members. Along this line, the ECB Council sets tradable-goods inflation in the euro 
area by weighing the preferred policies of the Board and the national central bank 
governors: 
(3)  NB Board ECB b b π − + π = π ~ ) 1 ( ~ ~ , 
with  ] 1 , 0 [ ∈ b  measuring the political weight or, to be precise, the overall vote share of 
Board members in the Council and  Board π ~  and  NB π ~  representing the Board’s and the 
governor’s preferred tradable-goods inflation rate, respectively. Since the vote shares 
of the “in” and “out” region might differ, the preferred policy of the national central 
bank governors is equivalently described as 
(4)  out in NB π γ − + π γ = π ~ ) 1 ( ~ ~ , 
where ] 1 , 0 [ ∈ γ  measures the relative voting power of the “in” region. Thus the overall 
vote share or bargaining power, with which the interests of all parties involved enter 
into the ECB decision-making process, are: for the “in” region  γ − ) 1 ( b ; for the “out” 
region ) 1 )( 1 ( γ − −b ; and for the Board b. 
  
The “in” region’s central bank’s ideal monetary policy is assumed to follow from a 
standard quadratic loss function that increases in the deviations of the region’s 
headline inflation and output from targets set to 0.  
(5) 
2 2
in in in y L λ + π = . 
The relative weight of the real target is λ > 0. It is assumed that the “out” region’s 
central bank is follows a more ambitious output target,  0
* > out y , while the weight 
associated with output losses, λ, as well as its inflation target is the same as in the “in” 
region: 
(6) 
2 * 2 ) ( out out out out y y L − λ + π = . 
Using equations (1), (2), (5), and (6), it is straightforward to derive the preferred 
policies of both regions. As Berger (2002) shows, the preferred policy of the “out” 
region differs from that of the “in” region in two respects. First, the more ambitious   38
output target implies a higher rate of inflation. Second, to compensate for the presence 
of structural inflation the “out” region’s central bank aims for lower tradable-goods 
inflation..  
 
It is assumed that the Board chooses monetary policy to minimize a loss function 
based on economically weighted euro area averages of headline inflation and output—
arguably in line with the policy targets specified in the Maastricht treaty:
24  
(7) 
2 2 ] ) 1 ( [ ] ) 1 ( [ out in out in Board y y L χ − + χ λ + π χ − + χπ = , 
where ] 1 , 0 [ ∈ χ  is the economic weight (e.g., the share in aggregate euro area GDP of 
the “in” region). Using again equations (1) and (2), it is easy to show that this implies 
that the higher the inflation in the “out” region is and the higher the region’s impact 
on euro area inflation, the lower the Board will set tradable-goods inflation to 
compensate the impact of structural inflation in the “out” region on the overall euro 
area inflation rate.  
Berger (2002) shows that under this set-up and assuming rational expectations, 
equilibrium inflation in the euro area will be: 
(8) 
. ) )] 1 )( 1 ( ) 1 ( [ ] ) 1 ( ([
1





out out out ECB
b b b b
y b b




∆ − λ γ − − + ∆ χ − − = π π π
 
 
The first part on the right hand side reflects the Board’s intention to compensate for 
the “out” region’s structural inflation by lowering tradable-goods inflation—weighted 
by  b, the Board’s vote share in the ECB Council. The second element in (8) 
summarizes the conflicting policy objectives of the “out” region itself. On the one 
hand, the region’s central bank, too, aims at decreasing tradable-goods inflation to 
compensate for its higher structural inflation rate ( out , π ∆ − ), on the other, the presence 
of a more ambitious growth target gives rise to an inflationary bias (
*
out y λ ). The net 
effect of these competing forces on equilibrium inflation depends on the 
ambitiousness of the “out” region’s growth target, the importance of the output target 
in its loss function, and the size of its structural inflation problem. Finally, the third 
element on the right hand side of equation (8) shows that the ECB will shift tradable-
goods inflation in the euro area to counter regional output shocks. The weight 
allocated to either region’s output shock is the sum of the weights attached to output 
stabilization in the relevant region by the respective central bank (i.e.,  ) 1 )( 1 ( γ − −b  for 
the “out” and  γ − ) 1 ( b  for the “in” region) and the Board (i.e.  χ b  in case of the “in” 
and ) 1 ( χ − b  in case of the “out” region).  
 
How does actual monetary policy in the euro area as described in equation (8) deviate 
from a benchmark policy that would be implemented if all Council members were 
solely interested in targets specified by the Maastricht treaty?  A reasonable 
benchmark policy rule along this line is one that stabilizes economically-weighted 
euro area averages of output and inflation around zero, i.e., that—on average—keeps 
prices stable and output at its natural level: 
                                                 
24 This is not to imply that only national central bank governors might take into account “national” 
policy goals in addition to the targets specified in the Maastricht treaty. The basic results of the model 
only require a more European perspective on the side of the Board.   39
(9) 
2 2 * * ] ) 1 ( [ ] ) 1 ( [ min arg ~
out in out in y y L χ − + χ λ + π χ − + χπ = ≡ π  s.t. (1) and (2). 
In words, 
* ~ π is the rate of tradables inflation that minimizes the loss function L
* 
subject to equations (1) and (2).
25 If monetary policy were conducted in line with this 
rule, introducing rational expectations would yield equilibrium tradables inflation of 
(10)  . ) ) 1 ( (
1
) 1 ( ~
,
*
Out In out ε χ − + ε χ
λ +
λ
− ∆ χ − − = π π  
A comparison of the benchmark euro area policy with actual ECB policy as depicted 
by equation (8) reveals a number of crucial differences: 
•  average tradables inflation as described by equation (8) will, in general, deviate 
from the benchmark (10). This is always true as long as  out out y ,
*
π ∆ ≠ λ . In 
particular, inflation is likely to exceed the inflation rate achieved under the 
benchmark policy, if the inflationary bias introduced by the “out” region’s central 
bank is high relative to the region’s structural inflation problem, i.e. 
out out y ,
*
π ∆ > λ . Moreover, inflation in the euro area will be the higher, the higher is 
the political weight of the “out” region in the ECB Council. 
•  actual  stabilization policy will, as a rule, not be optimal. In particular, it is 
straightforward to show that if the “out” region’s political weight in actual ECB 
decision making deviates from its economic weight and output shocks in the “in” 
and “out” region do not coincide, the ECB’s stabilization efforts will deviate from 
the “first best” benchmark.  
One way to ensure that actual ECB policy adheres to the benchmark policy is to give 
the Board sole authority setting monetary policy in the euro area. This is a direct 
implication of the assumption that the Board follows the policy ideals of the 
Maastricht treaty, i.e. seeks to minimize a euro area loss function based on 
economically weighted averages. If the Board does not hold full authority over 
monetary policy, a “second best” solution to bring actual ECB policy closer to the 
benchmark is to ensure that the political weight of the countries represented in 
Council is in line with their economic weight. Decreasing the mismatch between 
economic and political weights would bring actual stabilization policy closer to the 
benchmark and, if the “out” region was politically over-represented before, reduce 
actual inflation. In fact, perfectly matching political and economic weights would 
even guarantee that actual stabilization policy is perfectly in line with the ideal policy 
of stabilizing the euro area business cycle based on a correctly weighted average of 
the underlying regional cycles. If perfect matching is not feasible, a “third best” 
solution would be bring the political weights of national central banks as closely as 
possible in line with their economic weight (see Berger 2002, for further details). 
                                                 
25 Note that, by construction, the loss function in the “first best” policy program is similar to the 
Board’s loss function (7).   40
Appendix 2. Data sources and methods of calculation 
 
The data-set we use in this paper comes from a variety of sources, but the main source 
is the IMF’s International Financial Statistics (IFS, hhtp://imfStatistics.org). From the 
IFS, we took data on industrial production and inflation for most countries. Another 
important source is the GGDC Total Economy Database (www.eco.rug.nl/ggdc). 
For industrial production, we rely on monthly data for the period 1985-2001 for 
the current 15 EU members and the period 1990-2001 for the 12 accession countries. 
For a number of accession countries, no data were available in IFS, or only for a subset 
of the 1990-2001 period. Also, a number of these countries do not report seasonally 
adjusted figures. First of all, no data were available in IFS for Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, 
Malta and Slovakia, while for Poland, the data stop at the end of 1995. The Central 
Statistical Bureau of Latvia  reports (seasonally adjusted) industrial production on a 
monthly basis from 1995 onwards. The Statistical Office of Estonia does not publish 
long time-series for industrial production, but industrial sales are available on a monthly 
basis from 1994 onwards. Using sales instead of production eliminates part of the 
cyclical behavior, since inventory adjustments are not taken into account, so the figures 
for Estonia should be regarded with caution. Finally, data for Slovakia and a longer time 
series for Poland were available from the Vienna Institute for International Economic 
Studies (WIIW). The WIIW also reports data for Bulgaria, but (visual) inspection of 
this series raised questions on the reliability. The very rapid inflation and the subsequent 
problems with deflating industrial production provide a further basis for doubting these 
data. We therefore dropped this series and do not report any business cycle correlations 
for Bulgaria, nor for Malta since we could not find any data on industrial production for 
this country.  
Next, we seasonally adjusted the industrial production figures for Cyprus, the 
Czech Rep., Estonia, Hungary, Lithuania, Poland, Romania and Slovakia using the 
Census X12 procedure from the U.S. Census Bureau as reproduced in EViews 4.0. In 
the case of Ireland, the IFS data revealed a large structural break around 1995. To solve 
this problem, we took the monthly industrial production figures from the Irish Central 
Statistics Office, which run from 1995 onwards and applied the growth rates from IFS 
to all the months before January 1995. Finally, Portugal showed anomalous industrial 
production figures and a gap in the series between July 1994 and February 1995. We 
interpolated these months linearly. This eliminates cyclicality, but since this is only for 
a short period, it is unlikely to pose large problems. The following table shows the 
beginning and end dates for our series:   41
Table A2.1 Starting and end dates for monthly data on Industrial Production 
EU15 Members  Accession Members 
Country  First month  Last month   Country  First month Last month 
Austria Jan-85  Feb-01  Bulgaria  n/a n/a 
Belgium Jan-85  Dec-00  Cyprus Jan-90  Dec-01 
Denmark Jan-85  Dec-01  Czech  Rep.  Jan-90  Dec-01 
Finland Jan-85  Dec-01  Estonia
a)  Jan-94 Dec-01 
France Jan-85  Dec-01  Hungary  Jan-90  Dec-01 
Germany Jan-85  Dec-01  Latvia  Jan-95  Dec-01 
Greece Jan-85  Jan-02  Lithuania  Jan-93  Dec-01 
Ireland Jan-85  Dec-02  Malta  n/a  n/a 
Italy Jan-85  May-02  Poland  Jan-90  Jun-01 
Luxembourg Jan-85  Jul-00  Romania  May-90  Dec-01 
Netherlands Jan-85  Dec-02  Slovakia  Jan-93  Dec-01 
Portugal Jan-85  Nov-00  Slovenia  Dec-91  Dec-01 
Spain Jan-85  Dec-02   
Sweden Jan-85  Jan-00   
UK Jan-85  Dec-02   
a) Data on industrial sales instead of industrial production. 
 
We also form a weighted euro-area index where we choose June 1995 as 100 and 
extrapolate forwards and backwards using the GDP-weighted growth rates of the 12 
euro-area countries. We chose to use this method for the whole period, since our 
method yields somewhat different results than the official series, which is published 
since January 1999 onwards. Possible reasons are the use of PPPs to weight the 
individual countries and the fact that we use GDP weights instead of value added in 
manufacturing weights. However, differences are not large and this ensures 
comparability with the EU12 indices we also calculate excluding each country 
consecutively. 
 
To decompose these series into a trend and a cyclical component, we filtered 
them using a Hodrick-Prescott filter with smoothing factor λ=14400 (the suggested 
value for monthly data). To minimize the end-point problems, which are present with 
all filters, we forecast the series for a full year assuming all series follow an AR(3) 
process. We use the trend series to calculate the cyclical component in each month as 
one plus the percentage deviation from trend in that month. Pair wise correlations for 
each country-couple (including the euro area) are then calculated. We also calculate a 
set of correlations for the euro area countries, where we exclude the country in question 
from the euro area index. 
 
Inflation is derived as the annualized average monthly change in the Consumer Price 
Index (CPI). All data on the CPI are from the IFS. We follow as similar procedure as 
for industrial production to calculate euro area inflation before 1999 and EU15 and 
EU27 inflation for the whole period. 
 
Our main source on GDP is the GGDC Total Economy Database. This database 
contains data on (real) GDP for a large number of countries converted at PPP to U.S. 
dollars. Since conversion to U.S. dollars using Purchasing-Power-Parities (PPPs) 
eliminates differences in the relative price level of countries, the resulting GDP levels 
can safely be compared. If we were to convert the GDP levels into a common currency 
using exchange rates, this would generally not be the case. The database does not cover   42
all countries in our sample, and in particular a number of the accession countries are not 
covered.  For those countries, we take GDP in current and constant prices from the IFS. 
We convert these from national currency to U.S. dollars using PPPs as published by the 
OECD (2002). Since these PPPs are for 1999, while the PPPs for the other countries are 
for 1996, we use the change in the country’s price level relative to that in the U.S. to 
calculate 1996 PPPs. These are then used to calculate GDP in U.S. dollars. We had to 
follow this procedure in the case of Luxembourg, Cyprus, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania 
and Malta. GDP levels for the euro area, EU15 and the hypothetical EU27 are then 
calculated by summing the GDP levels of the relevant countries over each of the years. 
In constructing euro area, EU12 and EU15 industrial production and inflation, we use 
the GDP weight for a specific year for each month in that year. 
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